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Abstract 
This paper canvasses the relationship between the fundamental human rights of freedom 
of expression and freedom of religion to establish whether New Zealand should criminalise 
or censor expression that causes offence to the religious sensibilities of followers of Islam. 
It analyses the legal framework in New Zealand and in the international arena to assess 
whether this adequately protects Muslims from offence on the basis of their belief, while 
retaining other people’s right to free speech. 
 
This paper draws on a number of international examples to highlight what the 
repercussions can be when one person’s right to free speech collides with another’s right 
to freedom of religion. Bearing in mind these examples, this paper analyses a number of 
key argument in favour of allowing free speech and in favour of introducing wider 
censorship regimes, to establish whether these examples should have been subject to 
censorship and how this could apply in the New Zealand context. This paper concludes 
that criminalisation is not the ideal way to prevent these occurrences in future, but 
censorship could be an option. This paper recommends a balancing exercise is undertaken 
within the current New Zealand Bill of Rights framework to establish whether an item of 
offensive expression should or should not be subject to censorship. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 8,076 words. 
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Freedom of religion 
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Censorship
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I Introduction  
“Kill me, but do not mock my faith”1 
 
For millennia, mankind has attempted to censor speech that blasphemes, defames or causes 
libel to religion. Socrates was expelled from Ancient Greece and eventually drank hemlock 
– causing his own death – after being charged with ‘sacrilegious blasphemy’ in 399 BC.2 
His pupil Plato later became a censor of materials relating to faith and religion, censoring 
the philosophical works of poets he considered an ideological danger.3  
 
Thousands of years later, the world continues to grapple with these same issues. When are 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression mutually exclusive? What are the 
limitations of the right to freedom of expression in relation to religion? Is the state justified 
in censoring speech that causes offence to the sensibilities of a person’s or a group’s 
religion? Should expression that offends religion be tolerated if it is not primarily motivated 
by the desire to offend, but is merely a by-product of, for example, a political or social 
statement, satire or the creation of art?    
 
A number of high-profile international cases recently have highlighted how important these 
rights are for different members of society and how, in a very small number of cases, the 
collision of these rights can lead to extreme violence, even death. Although New Zealand 
has been sheltered from this extreme violence, Islamophobia (where non-Muslims perceive 
Muslims as a threat) is rising in New Zealand, as is Islamophobic-type expression.4  
  
  
1  Old Arab proverb, quoted in: Richard Webster A Brief History of Blasphemy: Liberalism, 
Censorship and the Satanic Verses (The Orwell Press, Southwold, 1990) at 32. 
2  Thomas C Brickhouse and Nicholas D Smith The trial and execution of Socrates: sources and 
controversies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
3  Ramona A Naddaff Exiling the Poets: the Production of Censorship in Plato’s Republic (The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002). 
4  Phillip Matthews “Is New Zealand discriminating against Muslims?” The Press (Christchurch, 6 
December 2014). 
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This paper analyses the existing New Zealand legal framework for protecting against 
blasphemy as well as a United Nations Resolution on defamation of religion. Using the 
concepts proposed in the Resolution, this paper questions whether New Zealand would 
benefit from criminalising or censoring expression that offends religion, either through 
additions or amendments to its existing legislative framework or the creation of a new one. 
To understand the consequences of this type of speech at the highest end of the spectrum, 
this paper touches on a number of international examples. International examples are used 
because, to date, New Zealand has not experienced extreme retaliation for offensive 
speech.    
 
Due to the potentially wide interpretation of the group of people classed as ‘Islamic’, this 
paper focuses on expression that causes offence to Islam’s three most revered religious 
concepts, the Qur’an, Allah and the Prophet Muhammad. While it is understood that it is 
not possible to offend these concepts directly, it is possible to offend the religion’s 
followers through insulting or ridiculing these concepts. 
 
This paper concludes that while states should take steps to discourage offensive expression 
and censorship in some cases is warranted, criminalisation is not, as it is likely this will 
only compound discriminatory opinions. In lieu of a criminal framework, this paper 
proposes a balancing exercise be introduced within New Zealand’s existing Bill of Rights 
context to establish whether offensive speech should be subject to censorship.  
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II Islam and the West  
Around 1.5 billion people class themselves as ‘Muslim’ across the globe.5 According the 
2013 census over 46,000 of these people live in New Zealand.6  
In recent times, the terms ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ is becoming more associated with race – 
mainly people of Middle Eastern origin – than it is with religion.7 While strictly the term 
refers to religion, in practice Islam in the Middle East is not simply a religion, it is also a 
way of life.8 Arguably, this wide classification makes it easier to discriminate against 
Muslims because the term encompasses a wider group of people, namely anyone from the 
Middle East. Respect for Islam as a way of life and a belief is important for its followers, 
meaning they are often particularly sensitive to offensive expression.9  
Within umma – the Islamic community – there is often no sharp distinction between 
religion and the state.10 Treason to the faith is analogous to the Western concept of treason 
to the state, meaning those who insult Islam through forms of expression are guilty of 
cultural treason.11 This is considered as serious as treason to the state is in the West, if not 
more serious.12  
 
External influences in the often repressed Muslim world – such as foreign social and 
political pressures or people who question the superiority of Islam – can incite sensibilities 
against that which is either unexplainable or outside a person’s belief system.13 When these 
views are expressed by people of different social or political groups it is often perceived as 
hostile and threatening, especially when the person has considerable power; the “more 
powerful, proximate, hostile, and unfamiliar the outsiders appear, the more threatening 
their actions are likely to appear.”14 
  
5  Klausen Jytte Cartoons That Shook the World (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009) at 85. 
6  Phillip Matthews, above n x. 
7  Steve Garner “The Radicalization of Muslims: Empirical Studies of Islamophobia” (2014) 41 Crit 
Sociol 9 at 10. 
8  William T Cavanaugh The myth of religious violence: Secular ideology and the roots of modern 
conflict (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 26. 
9  Ron E Hassen “Blasphemy and Violence” (2011) 55 Int Stud Q 23 at 28. 
10  Ali A Mazrui “The Satanic Verses or Satanic Novel? Moral Dilemmas of the Rushdie Affair” (1990) 
15 Alternative 97 at 98. 
11  At 99. 
12  At 99. 
13  Hassen, above n 9 at 30. 
14  At 30. 
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III Legal Framework 
A United Nations Resolution  
Between 1999 and 2010 – encouraged by a number of Muslim-majority member states –
different United Nations (UN) bodies enacted approximately 20 resolutions relating to 
defamation of religion.15  
 
In 2009, the UN General Assembly passed a Resolution Combatting Defamation of 
Religion.16 The Assembly expressed “deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions, 
and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief."17  
 
As it currently stands, the Resolution does not create a binding offence under international 
law, instead it condemns ‘defamation of religion’.18 While the UN has discussed the option 
of adding defamation of religion as a fundamental principle of international human rights 
law, this has not happened,19 and most Western member-states would not support its 
introduction.20  
  
  
15  Brett G Scharffs International Law and the Defamation of Religion Conundrum (2013) 11 Review 
of Faith & International Affairs 66 at 68. 
16  Resolution Aimed at Combatting Defamation of Religion GA Res 64/156, A/Res/64/156 (2009).  
17  United Nations “Third Committee Approves Resolution Aimed at ‘Combating Defamation of 
Religion” (press release, 12 November 2009).  
18  Resolution Aimed at Combatting Defamation of Religion, above n 16. 
19  Freedom House “New Freedom House Study Shows Blasphemy Laws a Serious Threat to Human 
Rights” (press release, 21 October 2010). 
20  Brett G Scharffs, above n 15 at 68. 
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The UN Resolution stresses discrimination of any form based on religious belief is a 
violation of an individual’s rights.21 It further expresses deep alarm at the increasing trend 
towards:22 
 
… discrimination based on religion or belief, including in some national policies, laws 
and administrative measures that stigmatize groups of people belonging to certain 
religions and beliefs under a variety of pretexts relating to security and irregular 
immigration, thereby legitimizing discrimination against them and consequently 
impairing their enjoyment of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
and impeding their ability to observe, practise and manifest their religion freely and 
without fear of coercion, violence or reprisal.  
  
The Resolution notes alarm at the rising cases of intimidation and negative projection of 
some religious minorities – especially Muslim minorities as a result of September 11 – that 
“threaten to impede their full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.23  
 
While the Resolution also condemned violence motivated by xenophobic ideas towards 
religious minorities,24 this paper will not deal with this area. Instead it looks at the less 
tangible concepts – the ones that are not as externally obvious as violence – such as 
expression that ‘stigmatises’, ‘impairs the enjoyment’, and ‘intimidates’ to establish 
whether these concepts should be subject to censorship or be criminalised under New 
Zealand’s domestic law. 
 
Defamation of religion is not a new concept; a number of countries legislate against 
blasphemy or religious insult. New Zealand has existing (however, un-utilised) blasphemy 
laws, elaborated on below. In Saudi Arabia, the crime of blasphemy – or more specifically 
of defaming the Prophet Muhammad – is punishable by death.25 In Russia, members of the 
punk rock band Pussy Riot were imprisoned for hooliganism motivated by religious hatred 
after singing a ‘punk prayer’ in a Moscow church asking the Virgin Mary to “throw Putin 
out”.26 
  
21  Resolution Aimed at Combatting Defamation of Religion, above n 16 at 2. 
22  At 2. 
23  At 2. 
24  At 2 - 3. 
25  Maryam Omidi “Crime Scene” (blog post, December 2012) Index on Censorship 
<www.indexoncensorship.org>.  
26  Omidi, above. 
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B Protection in domestic statute 
1 Crimes Act 1961 
Under section 123(1) of New Zealand’s Crimes Act 1961, “[e]very one [sic] is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year who publishes any blasphemous libel.”27  
 
The section dictates that whether the material is blasphemous is a question of fact;28 no one 
will commit a crime against this section if the expression, argument or opinion on religion 
is delivered “in good faith and conveyed in decent language”;29 and leave must be granted 
by the Attorney-General before someone is prosecuted.30  
 
Section 123 is a vestige of English common law, under which prosecutions for the criminal 
offence of blasphemy occurred frequently until the beginning of last century.31 In 2008, 
Britain and Wales’ Criminal Justice and Immigration Act removed the common law 
offences of blasphemy and religious libel.32 Prior to that, the last prosecution was in the 
1979 case Whitehouse v Lemon33, where the editor of the Gay News was prosecuted for 
publishing a poem describing Christ engaging in homosexual acts in explicit detail. This 
included describing “acts of sodomy and fellatio with the body of Christ immediately after 
the moment of His death.”34 
 
If New Zealand were to consider precedent from the United Kingdom binding, section 123 
of the Crimes Act would not protect Muslims from blasphemous expression because courts 
have stipulated the section only applies to followers of Christianity.35  
  
  
27  Crimes Act 1961 at s 123(1). 
28  At 123(2). 
29  At s 123(3). 
30  At s 123(4). 
31  Peter Crane and Joanne Conaghan The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, 
online ed, 2009) at ‘blasphemy’. 
32  Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) at s 79. 
33  Whitehouse v Lemon [1979] AC 617. 
34  At 618. 
35  This conclusion is based on precedent from the United Kingdom, see for example: R v Waddington 
(1822) 107 ER 11, 1 B & C 26 (KB) and R v Carlile (1821) 1 St Tr (NS) 1033. 
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2 Bill of Rights 
In practice, New Zealand never embraced the offence of blasphemy like the United 
Kingdom, and section 123 of the Crimes Act has only been used once, in 1922.36  More 
commonly, situations of this kind are dealt with under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZBORA), specifically under sections 13, freedom of thought and religion37, and 
20, the right to practice religion38. Religious minorities are further protected from 
discrimination by section 19, freedom from discrimination.39  
 
However, the protections offered under NZBORA and the international human rights law 
on which it is based, do not specifically protect against religious defamation or insult. This 
was confirmed by the New Zealand High Court in Browne v CanWest TV Works Ltd40 
where Wild J quoted a European Court of Human Rights decision to explain the scope of 
section 13. He stated the right to freedom of religion “does not, in terms, guarantee a right 
to protection of religious feelings.”41  
 
What it does do is protect humans and grant them freedom in the practice of their religion. 
It does not stipulate this practice must be free from criticism or ridicule.42   
 
Under section 5, any rights may be subject to limitations if “demonstrably justified” and 
prescribed by law.43 They may be further subject to section 14 NZBORA, the right to 
freedom of expression,44 discussed below.  
  
  
36  R v Glover [1922] GLR 185. 
37  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 13. 
38  S 20. 
39  S 19. 
40  Browne v CanwWest TV Works Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 654, (2007) 8 HRNZ 499.  
41  Otto Preminger Institut v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34 (ECHR), quoted in Browne v CanwWest TV 
Works Ltd, above at [50]. 
42  Scharffs, above n 15 at 68. 
43  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 37 at s 5. 
44  S 14. 
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3   Balancing exercise 
When a NZBORA right is subject to section 5, the Supreme Court in Brooker v Police45 
held that a balancing exercise must be undertaken to “assess the importance and impact of 
the particular rights in the circumstances.”46 The exercise requires the particular situation 
to be examined, giving due weight to both the conflicting interests, keeping in mind the 
purpose of the court is “to reach its decision through structured reasoning rather than an 
impressionistic process.”47 
 
In Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General the court questioned whether the 
publication of an accused person’s previous convictions in a newspaper breached the right 
to a fair trial.48 The Gisborne Herald argued publication was in the public interest and 
therefore a manifestation of the right to freedom of expression, which overruled the fair 
trial right.49 This argument was rejected by the court ruling that in cases like this, public 
policy – which suggests people are guaranteed a fair trial – warrants the curtailing of 
freedom of the expression.50 
 
IV Freedom of Expression 
Everyone in New Zealand has the “right to freedom of expression, including the freedom 
to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.”51 
A Arguments in favour of freedom of expression 
Three main arguments support free speech: truth, self-fulfilment and citizen participation 
in democracy.52 Each argument will be analysed to understand whether speech offending 
Islamic sensibilities is the type of speech that should be protected from criminalisation or 
censorship under NZBORA.  
  
  
45  Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91. 
46  At [131]. 
47  At [132]. 
48  Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General [1995] 3 NZLR 563. 
49  At 317. 
50  At 318. 
51  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1993, above n 37, s 14. 
52  Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) at 6. 
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1 Truth 
This argument finds it roots in the works of utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill and 
basically suggests open discussion allowing for the discovery of truth is fundamental for a 
society to function appropriately.53 If speech and expression is restricted, “society may 
prevent the ascertainment and publication of true facts and accurate judgment”.54 
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mill wrote that liberty of thought and discussion 
was one of the most important securities against a corrupt or tyrannical government.55 He 
believed silencing even one opinion was evil and robbed the human race:56 
 
… [i]f the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error 
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. 
 
Mill argues that while it may seem like there is some justification in censoring discussions 
on the basis it is incorrect or untrue, censorship further prevents the pursuit of truth.57 
Silencing discussion based on the assumption that it is incorrect, according to Mill, is an 
assumption of ‘infallibility’.58  Whereas history shows us many ideas we currently believe 
are infallible will be rejected by future ages, just as many from the past are rejected in our 
present age.59  
 
Although written over a century ago, Mill’s conclusion on this point is still relevant today. 
For religion, it is impossible to confirm the infallibility of a majority of claims made by all 
the world’s different religions and, consequently, it is impossible to prove the infallibility 
of most critique. Much of the dialog shown to offend Muslim sensibilities has a much wider 
purpose than simply causing offence and it appears Mill would not support the censorship 
of this content as it is blocking the pursuit of truth, which in this case is the questioning of 
the belief and the consequences of that belief.  
  
  
53  Eric Barendt, above n 52 at 8. 
54  At 8. 
55  John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, Aylesbury, 1991) at 20. 
56  At 21. 
57  At 22. 
58  At 23. 
59  At 23. 
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For example, Submission, a short film directed by Dutch film director Theo Van Gogh and 
written by former Muslim, political activist and member of the Netherlands’ Parliament 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, focuses on the enslavement of women in the Muslim world.60   
 
This film constituted a social comment about the submission of women in Islamic culture, 
focusing on the psychological and physical violence that can be levied against them within 
the home.61 Ali’s aim in making the film was to shock and she expected a large portion of 
the Muslim community would come down against her. She wanted to “needle people into 
thinking [and] confront them with dilemmas.”62 What she did not expect was that the film 
would incite Mohammed Bouyeri, a Muslim who was born and raised in the Netherlands, 
to murder and partially decapitate Van Gogh on a busy street in Amsterdam.63 
 
Ali’s determination to link the Qur’an with sex and sexual violence and to show the 
brutality of the Qur’an was considered extremely offensive,64 offensive enough to warrant 
murder. 
 
Placing to one side the threat to personal safety, when analysed in light of Mill’s truth 
argument, this movie – while offensive to Islam – appears to be an example of the type of 
expression that searches for truth and therefore we should be encouraging, not censoring, 
it. 
  
  
60  Simon Cottee “We Need to Talk About Mohammed” (2014) 54 Brit J Crimnol 981 at 986. 
61  Rachel Blumenthal “Looking for Home in the Islamic Diaspora of Ayann Hirsi Ali, Azar Nafisi, 
and Khanled Hoessini” (2012) 34 ASQ 250 at 250.  
62  Ian Buruma Murder in Amsterdam – the Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance 
(Penguin Press, New York, 2007) at 177. 
63  Kimberley L Thachuk, Marion E Spike and Courtney Richardson “Home Grown Terrorist: The 
Threat Within” (thesis, Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense 
University, May 2008) at 18. 
64  Ian Buruma, above n 62 at 180. 
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The ‘truth’ argument is also often referred to as the ‘marketplace of idea’; after American 
Supreme Court Justice Holmes famously said in 1919, that “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the markets”.65 This could 
also be applied to the idea of religious offence. In the ‘marketplace’ of religions – for there 
are many – different religions need to be able to stand up against critique or offence. Rather 
than punishing those who ask the questions, it could be suggested that followers of Islam 
should welcome the opportunity to show their faith can stand up against the competition of 
the markets. How exactly this would occur in practice is outside the ambit of this paper. 
 
Lectures given in 1983 and 1984 by French philosopher Michel Foucault built on Mill’s 
idea of free expression as an instrument to find truth through analysing the ancient Greek 
concept of parrhesia, or free speech.66  Foucault translated his ideas of freedom by 
interpreting the role of the speaker and truth-teller in Greek philosophy.67 Foucault 
concludes that the underlying principle of truthfulness in expression was present as far back 
as ancient Greek and Latin practice.68  
 
In Foucault’s own words, the lectures did not deal with the problem of truth, “but with the 
problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity”.69 According to Foucault:70 
 
… Parrhesia has the effect of (re)placing the subjective at the centre of the notion of 
free speech such that it coincides with the objective creating a space for 
parrhesiatically true utterances. 
  
  
65  Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919) at 630. 
66  Thomas Schwarz “Ancient Frankness: Foucault’s Aesthetics of Existence and the Question of Free 
Speech” (2000) 9 Pretext: Literary and Cultural Studies 125 at 125. 
67  At 125. 
68  Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth: the Government of Self and Others (lecture, Berkeley 
University, 1 February 1984). 
69  Michel Foucault, Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia (lecture, Berkeley 
University, November 1983) at Introduction. 
70  James Ressel “The Problem of ‘Free Speech’ in the Idea(l) of Freedom of Speech” (2008) 15 ELAW 
168 at 175. 
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He argued the way people use language can be considered as the “building blocks”71 of 
reality. Through using truth-telling discourse or free expression, people can communicate 
openly and truthfully about their opinions and ideas.72 In essence this can be considered as 
a very complex defence of free speech as a mechanism for truth. Foucault goes further, 
suggesting discourse plays an important part in constructing our social reality and can be 
used as a mechanism for power; “the one who defines the world, controls it.”73 
 
It appears Foucault would have supported both the freedom to express religion, but, more 
importantly, also the right to critique and if need be, offend religion through discourse or 
expression. However, for this discourse to fall within Foucault’s realm, it would have 
needed an element of truth, such as a revelation or something distinguishing the discourse 
from simply offensive expression for the purpose of causing offence, Parrhesia (truth) 
must be present. 
2 Free speech as an aspect of self-fulfilment 
This argument – the least utilitarian of the three arguments in favour of free speech – 
suggests restricting expression inhibits the individual growth of personality and psyche.74 
This liberal theory regards the value of autonomy as more important than the disvalue of 
the potential consequences of this autonomy.75 In other words, allowing people the freedom 
to say what they wish is more important than the threat of what they may say with this 
freedom. 
 
This theory regards human communication as essential to self-fulfilment because 
suppressing the speech of individuals – even if this speech offends others – is robbing 
people of the opportunity to participate in public discourse.76 On the face of it, it appears 
that this theory would also not support criminalising or censoring speech offending Islamic 
sensibilities. 
 
  
71  Sara Savage and Jose Liht “Religious Speech: the Ingredients of a Binary World View” in Ivan Hare 
and James Weinstein Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 
488 at 488. 
72  At 488. 
73  At 488. 
74  Eric Barendt, above n 52 at 14. 
75  Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1999) at 17. 
76  Ian Cram “The Danish Cartoons, Offensive Expression, and Democratic Legitimacy” in Ivan Hare 
and James Weinstein Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009). 
 Lidewij Oosterhoff: Laws 530 Research Paper 
 DAMNED IF YOU DO: Should New Zealand criminalise or censor expression that offends Islam? 
13 
Professor of Philosophy Seanna Velentine Shiffin favours what she describes as the 
thinker-based foundation for freedom of speech.77 Shiffrin argues legislation aimed at 
restricting free speech – such as the New Zealand blasphemy laws under section 123 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and interpretations of NZBORA rights inconsistent with section 14 of 
that Act – inhibits an individual’s self-expression by censoring or criminalising the 
dissemination of materials essential for the “free development and operation of a person’s 
mind.”78 In reaching this conclusion, Shiffrin begins from the assumption that human 
beings have significant (although imperfect) rational, perceptual and sentient capacities and 
these form the core of what we value about ourselves.79 Shiffrin concludes that if the 
autonomous operation of the mind is valued and treated with respect, then the mind must 
be left alone to operate autonomously. Speech and free speech are necessary for this 
autonomy and for humans to realise their foundational and central interests and, most 
importantly, their capacity for thought and reason.80 
 
Shiffin believes for many people, thoughts will only be fully identified if made 
linguistically or representationally explicit:81 
 
… one cannot fully develop a complex mental world, identify its contents, evaluate 
them, and distinguish between those that are merely given and those one endorses, 
unless one has the ability to externalize bits of one's mind [through linguistic 
expression]. 
 
To a degree, the autonomous operation of the mind appears to be exactly what Muslims 
want to censor. As with the Christianity in the West a number of centuries ago, Muslims 
feel strongly aggrieved by expression that questions or dissents against any part of the 
Islamic faith, especially about the Prophet.82 In many Muslim countries, apostasy 
(renouncing a part of the Islamic faith) is punishable by death.83 Questioning beliefs 
appears to be exactly what expression needs to be able to do to assist self-fulfilment.    
 
  
77  Seanna Valentine Shiffrin “A thinker-based approach to freedom of speech (2011) 27 Const. 
Comment. 238. 
78  At 287. 
79  At 287. 
80  At 291. 
81  Shiffrin, above n 77 at 292. 
82  Christopher J van der Krogt “Why is Freedom of Speech a Problem for so Many Muslims?” in Erich 
Kolig (ed) Freedom of Speech and Islam (Routledge, Dunedin, 2016) 21 at 23. 
83  At 21. 
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Like the argument for truth, it appears this argument does not support censorship of 
expression offending religious sensibilities, especially when this questions a part of the 
faith in an academic manner. However, when it merely intends to offend or ridicule the 
followers of this religion without questioning, using reason or externalising part of one’s 
mind, it is not clear whether the argument defends it against censorship. 
 
While not a universally held view,84 it is the author’s view that the French Charlie Hebdo 
cartoons were neither artistic nor did they make a genuine political or social statement. The 
magazine published a number of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in different 
poses considered insulting to Islam, such as a picture of Muhammed saying it is hard to be 
loved by imbeciles.85  
 
It could be argued a piece of expression like this does not further a person’s thought or 
ability to reason, because it does not contribute to the betterment of the academic, artistic, 
philosophical or other qualities of those who view it. Accordingly it does not add to a 
person’s self-fulfilment. It is not suggested that criticism of religion should automatically 
be considered discriminatory, but when this criticism has no other purpose than to offend, 
there is a chance it should be. On this basis, one can argue censorship be allowed for 
expression that has only one purpose, to offend followers of the Muslim faith through 
offending a key aspect of their religion, such as the Prophet Muhammad.  
3 Citizen participation in democracy 
This utilitarian philosophical theory is fundamental in the development of twenty-first 
century free speech law.86 Academics suggest that should democracy operate as intended, 
citizens must be given the freedom to express their opinions, especially about how the state 
operates.87 Academic Dieter Grimm states that “[t]here can be no democracy without 
public discourse and no public discourse without freedom of speech, freedom of the media, 
and freedom of information”.88 
 
  
84  Robert Chalmers “Ralph Steadman on Charlie Hebdo, the Right to Offend and Changing the World; 
Steadman, the satirical cartoonist extraordinaire, reflects on the Charlie Hebdo murders, in words 
and in art” Newsweek (online ed, 14 January 2015). 
85  Lisa Peet “Libraries after Charlie Hebdo: confronting potential for violence, self-censorship” (2015) 
140 LIBR J 12 at 12. 
86  Barendt, above n 52 at 23. 
87  At 21. 
88  Dieter Grimm “Freedom of Speech in a Globalized World” in in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein 
Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 11. 
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While required for all forms of democracy, freedom of speech and expression is absolutely 
fundamental for a state to operate as a ‘direct-democracy’, where some of the state’s power 
is vested in its subjects by allowing them to be involved with the making of public policy 
decisions89 and where the government’s actions reflect what the people want.90 Law 
Professor Robert Post suggests democracy needs open discussion for citizens to retain their 
ability to identify with the state, therefore, freedom of speech is a necessary condition for 
democratic legitimacy.91  
 
In 2005, a cartoon depicting Muhammed with a turban in the shape of a bomb was 
published by Danish magazine Jyllands-Posten and resulted in protests across the world.92 
According to Post, the cartoon was an example of public discourse required to ensure state 
legitimacy:93  
 
… [i]f public policy is to be directed by an intelligently informed public opinion, and 
its citizens are to feel that public policy is potentially responsive their [sic] views, they 
must be free to express and discuss their perspectives on the matters satirized in the 
Jyllands-Posten cartoons. 
 
Again the author does not regard the Danish cartoons as expression of artistic merit, nor 
consider they added anything of significance to democratic or political discourse. It could 
be argued, on Post’s reasoning, that even if the cartoons were not politically charged, they 
initiated public discussion. They encouraged people to talk about the position and 
integration of Muslims into European society, Islamophobia, religious tolerance and 
immigration. In that sense, it is conceded the cartoons may have had some impact on 
democracy, because it may have encouraged people discuss important public policy 
decisions. 
 
  
89  Mark Gobbi “The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin and Role 
of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand” (LLM thesis at Victoria 
University, Wellington, 1994) at 10. 
90  Richard Ekins “The Value of Representative Democracy” in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight 
(eds) We the People(s), Participation in Government (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011) 
at 29 
91  Robert Post “Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad” (2007) 14 Constellations 
72 at 76. 
92  Peter McGraw and Joel Warner “The Danish Cartoon Crisis of 2005 and 2006” The Huffington Post 
(online ed, 25 November 2012). 
93  Robert Post, above n 91 at 76. 
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In the Supreme Court decision Whitney v California (No 3) Brandeis J made what has 
become known as one of the strongest defences for freedom of speech, stating that the men 
who won independence in the United States:94 
 
… believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; …. that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and 
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 
 
This statement suggests protection from censorship should be granted to speech that seeks 
the political truth, to ensure people are not able to become inert due to lack of information. 
The statement does not appear to provide protection from censorship for merely offensive 
expression that does not enhance public discourse.  
 
Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn takes another look at this, suggesting it is not so much 
the ‘freedom to speak’ that must be protected from censorship but “the freedom of those 
activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern’”.95 He explains that a sole 
action of voting is not an act of democracy, contrary to how it is often portrayed, but is 
merely the outward expression of a citizen’s responsibility to judge how those in power are 
performing.96 To undertake this responsibility, voters must be able to make a choice 
derived from their sane and objective judgment. For this judgment to exist, citizens must 
have unimpeded access to “all forms of thought and expression within the range of human 
communication.”97  
  
  
94  Whitney v California (No 3) 274 US 347 (1925) at 375. 
95  Alexander Meiklejohn “The First Amendment is Absolute” (1961) 1961 Sup Ct Rev 245 at 255. 
96  Alexander Meiklejohn, above n 95 at 255. 
97  At 256. 
 Lidewij Oosterhoff: Laws 530 Research Paper 
 DAMNED IF YOU DO: Should New Zealand criminalise or censor expression that offends Islam? 
17 
Meiklejohn stresses that to perform their role as voters, citizens must have open and free 
access to education; philosophy and sciences; literature and art; and public discussions on 
public issues. Education, he says, will cultivate the mind of a citizen so “that he shall have 
the wisdom, the independence, and, therefore, the dignity of a governing citizen”;98 
philosophy and sciences so that they may gain “a knowledge and understanding of men”;99 
and literature and the arts so citizens may be able to express themselves unimpeded in these 
mediums because they “lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and 
response to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare are created”.100 Lastly, 
public discussion and access to information must be freely available to ensure that in a 
deeper sense, citizens govern the state, rather than the other way around.101 This concept 
forms the basis for a direct-democracy (as mentioned above) and for wider access to public 
information by individuals. Meiklejohn stresses that over “our governing, they have no 
power. Over their governing we have sovereign power.”102   
 
Philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) defended free speech on similar grounds to 
Meiklejohn, albeit a number of centuries earlier. He was the first person to “conceptualize 
the rule of publicity as the foundation for the doctrine of the sovereignty of public 
opinion.”103 A follower of utilitarianism, Bentham views free speech as the primary 
defender of public discussion and as a check on political authority and the legislature.104 
He regarded free speech as fundamental should citizens wish to surveil the actions of the 
state. 
 
It appears academics in favour of a more direct-democracy type governance model agree 
that in general speech should not be censored as this prevents the dissemination of truth 
and the exercise of an individual’s democratic right. Interestingly, academic and New 
Zealander Jeremy Waldron argues New Zealand politics should aspire to implement more 
direct-democracy policies,105 yet he also supports the censorship of expression that affronts 
the dignity of sections of society.106  
 
  
98  At 257. 
99  At 257. 
100  At 257. 
101  At 257. 
102  At 257. 
103  Slavko Splichal “Bentham, Kant, and the right to communicate” (2003) 15 Crit. Rev. 285 at 289. 
104  At 290. 
105  Jeremy Waldron Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) at 283. 
106  At 106. 
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This again appears to suggest free speech should be encouraged on topics that help people 
voice their views on, and participate in, the democratic process; where this is not the case, 
it seems less likely the speech is protected from censorship. Waldron appears to go further 
and argues to only protect speech supporting the democratic process if it does not affront 
sections of society’s dignity. This means all offensive speech, no matter whether it supports 
the democratic process or not, should be censored (this is discussed further below). 
 
New Zealanders tend to value a more direct-democracy model of governance107 and are 
also mindful not to offend minorities or appear to discriminate.108 This suggests support 
for a framework in favour of free speech, but realises there are limits to this freedom and 
censors highly offensive expression. The next part of this paper explores where the 
threshold for censorship should rest.  
B Free speech and its limits 
While most theorists agree freedom of speech is not an absolute and untouchable right, 
many grappled with where exactly the right to free speech ends, especially when one 
person’s right to free speech interferes with someone else’s fundamental right, such as the 
right to freedom of religion.109 
1 Speech that impedes others’ free choice 
Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) suggests individual freedom or autonomy 
should not be interfered with unless it hinders the freedom of another.110 “I ought never to 
act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law”, is the categorical imperative by which Kant reasons every person should live their 
life.111 Categorical imperatives should bind one’s actions no matter what their desires, in 
contrast to hypothetical imperatives which one should only obey if it suits their desire.112 
Breaking a categorical imperative is both immoral and unreasonable.113  
 
  
107  Gobbi, above n 89 at 16. 
108  Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government & Politics (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2006). 
109  Steven Shiffrin “Freedom of Speech and Two Types of Autonomy” (2011) 27 Const. Comment. 387 
at 340.  
110  At 340. 
111  Immanuel Kant “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” in Robert Johnson “Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy” (June 2012) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <www.plato.stanford.edu>.  
112  Immanuel Kant, above. 
113  Immanuel Kant, above. 
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Basically, to understand whether Kant would support censorship of religiously offensive 
expression, one must ask whether it would be alright for everyone to use such expression. 
 
The concept of freedom is a “central normative and metaphysical concept” in Kant’s 
philosophy.114 He considers the essence of morality to be located in the exercise of free 
choice by human beings, so long as this does not conflict with another’s ability to do the 
same.115 He realises there must be limits to freedom, stating there is nothing “good without 
limitations except good will”116. 
 
It appears Kant would censor offensive religious expression if it conflicts with another 
person’s exercise of free choice or if it is legally and socially unacceptable for the action 
to become law. Arguably, speech that offends religious sensibilities falls into neither of 
these categories unless it incites someone to do harm or commit crime. What if the harm 
caused does not have a direct causal connect to the inciting of harm, discrimination or 
marginalisation of the minority group targeted in the expression? For example, the harm is 
not caused to that group, but rather by this group themselves. 
 
Published in 1988, The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie caused a Muslim ‘panic’ around 
the world and at the time was considered “one of the most controversial and certainly the 
most publicized novel in history.”117 The book was considered highly offensive to Islam 
because – among other things – the word Satanic in the book’s title was considered to refer 
to the Qur’an (although Rushdie denied this)118 and it discussed an often-ignored section 
of the Qur’an where the Prophet Muhammad agrees to the worship of Gods other than 
Allah if people subscribe to Islam.119 
  
  
114  Paul Guyer “Freedom: will, autonomy” in Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (eds) Immanuel 
Kant: Key Concepts (Acumen Publishing Limited, Durnham, 2011) 85 at 85. 
115  At 86. 
116  Immanuel Kant in Paul Guyer, above n 114 at 87. 
117  Elias D Mallon Offense and Counter-Offense (1989) 160 America 327 at 327. 
118  Ali A Mazrui, above n 10 at 111. 
119  Salman Rushdie The Satanic Verses (Penguin Random House, London, 1988) at 111. 
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In February 1989, in retaliation to the book’s publication, Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa – or a call to execute – against Rushdie and anyone 
involved with the publication of the book.120 Other Iranian leaders supported this and 
offered rewards of up to $3 million for the assassin.121  
 
While Rushdie has so far not been assassinated, he has spent a lot of the past two decades 
in hiding and the Japanese translator of the book was murdered in 1991.122 
 
In the Rushdie case and in a number of other extreme cases, including the murder of Theo 
Van Gogh, mentioned above, the ultimate harm caused is not to the group marginalised by 
the expression but to those involved with its publication. 
 
Arguably a book is very different to a cartoon depicted on the front cover of a magazine. 
Magazines are hung up in the front windows of stores and on boards outside and are 
immediately offensive when viewed, whereas someone needs to pick a book up and read it 
in order to realise the offence. Moreover, it is the author’s view that the Satanic Verses is 
a piece of literature with high artistic merit, so the threshold for censorship due to the 
offence caused should be higher. 
 
When looked at in light of Kant’s literal reasoning, it could be concluded that Rushdie’s 
and Van Gogh’s expression should be censored as it resulted in harm (to the expressor). 
However, these are extreme examples that turn traditional reasoning on its side, instead of 
censoring expression because it harms a minority group, it is censored because there is a 
real risk the expressor or those involved with its release could be harmed. Whether this is 
the type of expression Kant intended to be censored is questionable.   
  
  
120  Reid Mortensen “Blasphemy in a Secular State: a Pardonable Sin?” (1994) 17 Univ N S W Law J 
409 at 414. 
121  Richard Abel Speech and Respect (Stevens, Sons/Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) at 15. 
122  Steven R Weisman “Japanese Translator of Rushdie Book Found Slain” New York Times (online ed, 
13 July 1991). 
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Undoubtedly this expression caused harm to some Muslims; it is unfathomable that 
someone would commit murder as revenge for expression if this expression did not incite 
strong emotion within that person. In the Rushdie case it is estimated more than 100,000 
people took to the streets to protest against the publication of the book;123 again this would 
suggest these people were aggrieved. However, apart from against the expressors and those 
involved with it, the expression did not incite anyone to commit a crime, nor would it be 
acceptable if the action of publishing any form of offensive books, cartoons or films 
became criminalised. 
 
Kant vehemently protects individual autonomy so long as it causes no harm, yet his 
definition of harm seems to focus more on physical rather than psychological harm. 
Therefore, it appears Kant would not have supported censorship of expression that offends 
the psyche and not body. 
2 Speech that is unequal 
Academic Catharine MacKinnon sees no issue with the censorship or potential 
criminalisation of offensive expression.124 Of the theorists analysed for this paper, she is 
considered to be the most willing to use censorship when one person’s freedom expression 
interferes with another person’s rights;125 in the current example the right to freedom of 
religion. 
 
MacKinnon suggests the importance society and governments place on protecting freedom 
of expression dates back to the widespread Western fear of communism during the last 
century.126 The era’s dread of suppression by the state remains a struggle in the human 
mind, “the risk is that marginal, powerless, and relatively voiceless dissenter with ideas we 
will never hear will be crushed by governmental power”.127  
 
MacKinnon argues it is actually the other way around: the law of equality and the law of 
freedom of speech are on a “collision course”,128 in the sense that protection of free speech 
fails to regard social inequalities and suppresses those at the fringes of society or those with 
no voice.129  
  
123  Richard Abel, above n 121 at 15. 
124  Catharine A MacKinnon Only Words (Harper Collins, London, 1994). 
125  At 14 
126  At 14. 
127  Catharine A MacKinnon, above n 124 at 14. 
128  At 51. 
129  At 51. 
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In the New Zealand context, the Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand 
(FIANZ) has seen growing trends of Islamophobia in New Zealand, especially a rise in 
verbal attacks.130 It would appear this is the speech MacKinnon would censor and 
potentially make subject to criminal sanctions. According to MacKinnon, the current 
freedom-of-expression-focused model in the West only perpetuates the marginalisation of 
groups such as Muslim minority groups. In MacKinnon’s model, the less speech these 
persons have, the more unequal they become,131 whereas the more speech one has, the 
more dominant they become.132  
 
As an alternative, MacKinnon suggests not questioning whether the right to free speech 
has been acceptably infringed, but whether or not the expression perpetuates the inequality 
of a marginalised group,133 which Islamophic expression does.  
3 Balancing exercise 
Robert Post – who defends freedom of speech for its importance in fostering democratic 
legitimacy (discussed above) – suggests he would support some censorship of material that 
offends subordinated or oppressed groups. It could therefore be inferred he could be in 
favour of censoring expression that offends followers of Islam in New Zealand. However, 
in another journal article, Post questions whether blasphemy of religion should be censored, 
specifically the Danish cartoons of Muhammad.134 In this article, Post concludes that if 
defamation of religion is made into an offence, the law will become “an instrument for 
exercising any opinion that a religious group might deem offensive.”135 
 
According to Post the Danish cartoons are “rather far from legally prohibited hate 
speech”.136 Suggesting the threshold should fall at censoring expression which constitutes 
‘hate speech’. While there is no legislation under international law defining what exactly 
“legally prohibited hate speech” is, Post analyses European Union and domestic European 
law and concludes it is speech causally connected to discrimination, oppression or 
violence.137 This is a higher threshold than merely causing offence.  
 
  
130  Philip Mathews, above n 4. 
131  Catharine A MacKinnon, above n 124 at 52. 
132  At 52. 
133  At 52. 
134  Robert Post, above n 91. 
135  Robert Post “Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad” at 80. 
136  At 84. 
137  At 83. 
 Lidewij Oosterhoff: Laws 530 Research Paper 
 DAMNED IF YOU DO: Should New Zealand criminalise or censor expression that offends Islam? 
23 
Unlike MacKinnon’s blanket ban, Post suggests when the free speech of one individual 
inhibits the rights of another, a balancing act must be undertaken.138 This must attempt to 
find a balance between the loss of the democratic liberties of the expressor and those 
affected.139 For example, in suppressing A’s speech, the loss of democratic legitimacy for 
A must be weighed against the democratic legitimacy that B loses for not suppressing that 
speech.140  
 
For example, one would ask if suppressing the speaker’s democratically legitimate freedom 
to verbally attacks Muslims in New Zealand outweighs the loss of democratic legitimacy 
for the Muslim recipient. In this case, it would appear the loss to the Muslim outweighs the 
loss of free speech for the expressor, because the harm caused by verbal attacks is more 
serious than the harm caused by not supressing them. 
 
Post defines ‘democratic legitimacy’ as a governance model wherein “ citizens [are] treated 
equally with respect to the requirements of autonomous participation in the practice of self-
government.”141 Like MacKinnon, Post suggests special consideration should be given to 
otherwise subordinated or oppressed groups.142 
 
If Post’s balancing exercise is literally applied to the extreme cases mentioned above, it 
would appear there are grounds to censor all of it because it resulted in the loss of the 
expressor’s life (Van Gogh) or freedom of movement (Rushdie). However, if a less literal 
approach is undertaken, it appears censorship is not as certain. Rushdie, for example, would 
lose more democratic legitimacy through censorship of his work than Muslims as a group 
would lose without its censorship. The Van Gogh case leads to a similar conclusion. 
 
Post does not discuss whether artistic merit is given a higher threshold, but it appears that 
if merit is taken into account as part of the balancing exercise, the suppression of offensive 
art would lead to a greater loss of democratic legitimacy for the artist. Post’s balancing 
exercise would be a good place to start when assessing whether expression that offends 
Islam should be supressed. The exercise can build on the precedent set down in Gisborne 
Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General. 
  
138  Robert Post “Democracy and Equality” (2006) 603 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 24. 
139  At 31. 
140  At 31. 
141  At 31 – 32. 
142  At 31 – 32. 
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4 Assaults on dignity 
Jeremy Waldron and Anshuman Modal both suggest it is not actually the speech itself that 
should be the focus of censorship, but the effect this speech arouses in the people it targets 
or affects.143 For example, the Van Gogh the film caused disgust and anger that the Qur’an 
was linked to sexuality. 
 
Modal supports speech that offends, stating that offence in itself is a form of verbal 
violence.144 Waldron on the other hand, stresses the importance of distinguishing between 
speech that causes ‘offence’ – as the aim of the law is not to protect people’s feelings from 
offence145 – and speech that affronts dignity.146 The latter is speech that impacts on 
someone’s status as an “equal in the community they inhabit, to their entitlement to basic 
justice and to the fundamentals of their reputation.”147  
 
Waldron is adamant the test for this must remain objective, while offence is a largely 
subjective concept focused on the feelings the expression causes for the person to who it is 
directed; an assault to someone’s dignity affects their more objective standing or reputation 
within society.148 Put more simply, the expression Waldron wants to protect people from 
is speech directed at a vulnerable person or groups of persons insulting their race, ethnicity, 
or religion.149 This is similar to what Modal proposes, however, it appears Waldron wants 
to ensure the law is taken seriously by putting a concrete legal test in place. 
 
On this basis it appears both academics would support New Zealand legislation censoring 
offence to religion. Waldron – although in principle he appears to agree with prohibiting 
the speech this paper is concerned with – would request the term ‘assault to dignity’ is used 
instead of the word ‘offensive’.  
  
  
143  Anshuman A Modal Islam and Controversy: The Politics of Free Speech After Rushdie (Palgrave McMillan, 
published online, 2014) at 23 and Jeremy Waldron The Harm of Hate Speech (Havard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2012) at 35. 
144  At 23. 
145  Jeremy Waldron above, n 143 at 106. 
146  At106. 
147  At 106. 
148  At 106 - 107. 
149  Jeremy Waldron above n 143 at 37. 
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Waldron uses the expression ‘hate speech’, however, the author does not propose that this 
is used. As mentioned above, the commonly accepted definition for ‘hate speech’ is speech 
inciting discrimination, oppression and violence,150 whereas the speech analysed in this 
paper is not this serious.  
 
V Discussion  
Temporary discussion tends to focus less on freedom of expression as a right that can 
achieve its three primary goals – truth, self-discovery and democratic legitimacy – and 
more on the right as warrant to offend, in this case, the right to ridicule another person’s 
faith without repercussion.  
 
Given the extensive array of people who class themselves as ‘Muslim’ and the relatively 
low threshold for causing ‘offence’, if New Zealand were to place a blanket ban censoring 
all types of expression that offends Muslims’ religious sensibilities, this could create a 
framework covering a wide range of expression.  
 
In lieu of such an extensive censorship regime, New Zealand could consider a different 
approach. In a similar vein to MacKinnon, it is proposed that instead of considering the 
rights – when in conflict – as mutually exclusive and trying to establish where their 
boundaries lie, the focus becomes on figuring out how the two can co-exist.  
 
People often adopt a starting point of “I” (they look to themselves) for considering whether 
their own expression should be protected by the right to freedom of expression or not.151 
The alternative is to encourage people to start with ‘you’; through analysing the 
fundamental human rights of others, to assess if their own expression encroaches on these.  
 
For a legal framework, it is proposed the existing NZBORA rights are used instead of the 
antiquated criminal offence of ‘blasphemy’ under the Crimes Act 1961. While it is 
acknowledged NZBORA does not hold supreme law status and can be overridden by other 
legislation,152 the Court of Appeal has held that where possible courts should interpret any 
statute as consistent with NZBORA.153  
 
  
150  Robert Post “Portraits of Muhammed”, above n 91at 84. 
151  Catharine A MacKinnon, above n 124 at 52. 
152  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, above n 37. 
153  Moonen v Film & Literature Review Board [2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
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It is predicted that criminalising offensive expression in New Zealand – such as the verbal 
attacks recorded by FIANZ – will be counterproductive in trying to prevent discrimination. 
There is a chance that if people who are predisposed to using offensive expression are given 
a criminal record for this, this will only perpetuate the discriminatory feelings and anger 
towards Muslims. 
 
The suggested focus under NZBORA should be whether one person’s right to freedom of 
expression infringes on another person’s right to freedom of religion and the unimpeded 
practice of this. If this is found to be the case, the next step is to question whether there are 
legitimate grounds warranting censorship of the expression. This will be based on the 
balancing exercise suggested by Post and used in the one used by New Zealand’s Supreme 
Court in Brooker v Police.154  
 
It is suggested the balancing exercise is enacted under the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 as a principle that allows for censorship of expression that offends 
religious sensibilities, subject to analysis of the factors outlined below. 
 
Near the end of the 1980s, thousands of followers of Islam burnt books and protested in 
other ways against the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel the Satanic Verses.155 At the 
time, it was not only those who followed the Muslim faith who protested against the 
publication of the book, the Archbishop of Canterbury declared that “offence to the 
religious beliefs of followers of Islam or any other faith is quite as wrong as is an offence 
to the religious beliefs of Christians”.156 Yet one could argue that a book only interferes 
with the freedom to exercise religion if an individual makes a deliberate choice to read it, 
and even then, if the book is a novel – like the Satanic Verses – this is a work of fiction. A 
book is very different to other forms of expression such as radio broadcasts or television 
programmes because a book requires a conscientious effort to accept the expression, 
whereby the others – especially radio broadcasts – are often delivered to people without 
their consent. Therefore, it is proposed the mode of delivering of expression is the first 
aspect to be taken into account as part of the balancing exercise.  
  
  
154  Brooker v Police, above n 45. 
155  Richard Abel, above n 121 at 14. 
156  Archbishop of Canterbury in Abel, above n 121 at 13. 
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It is the author’s view that the cartoons in the Danish magazine Jyllands-Posten and the 
French magazine Charlie Hebdo sought to achieve only one purpose, to offend followers 
of Islam through ridiculing the Prophet Muhammed. While it is accepted that this view is 
not shared by all commentators, the cartoons do not appear to contribute significantly in 
any way towards democratic legitimacy through effective social or political comment, nor 
are they of any particular artistic merit. Should these cartoons then be protected against 
censorship as a legitimate goal of the right to freedom of expression? It is argued no, this 
is not the primary aim of the freedom. On this basis, the second consideration that should 
be assessed as part of the balancing exercise is whether the expression has any artistic merit. 
Obviously artistic merit or other merit is a subjective element, creating a legal test for this 
is outside the ambit of this paper. 
 
The final consideration, which ties in with artistic merit and the question of whether the 
cartoons should have been subject to censorship, is to assess the expression’s purpose. 
Similar to Foucault’s reasoning on the concept of Parrhesia, this consideration can 
question whether the expressor was acting in a capacity as truth-teller or in an otherwise 
genuine manner. 
 
The commonly referred to objective for protecting freedom of expression is the right should 
give people the freedom – among other aspects – to speak out against political regimes, 
promote democracy and provide social commentary. As part of the balancing exercise, it 
is proposed freedom of expression is given wider scope to protect offensive expression, 
when the expression’s purpose goes beyond merely causing offence. When the offence is 
simply a by-product of a completely different and unrelated purpose, this should be given 
even more weight in opposition to censorship. 
 
An initial list of purposes allowing higher thresholds of offensive expression could be 
garnered from Meiklejohn’s list of qualities citizens should have access to if they are to 
fulfil their job as effective voters, notably, education, philosophy, sciences, literature, art 
and public issues.  
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This framework is in line with existing New Zealand legislation. Section 3(4)(c) of the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 notes “the character of the 
publication, including any merit, value, or importance that the publication has in relation 
to literary, artistic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, or other matters” should be 
considered before deciding whether a publication is objectionable.157 This section of the 
Act predominantly deals with publications that are objectionable because they depict 
torture, graphic violence or other offensive sexual or violent conduct.158 However it 
provides evidence that New Zealand law has the scope to take into account the objective, 
the character and any merit of a potentially offensive expression.  
 
Section 23(3) further states that material otherwise classed as objectionable “may be made 
available to particular persons or classes of persons for educational, professional, scientific, 
literary, artistic, or technical purposes”.159 The Court of Appeal has held that the test for 
section 23(3) is whether the expression should be made available for artistic purposes rather 
than a question of the artistic merit of the expression.160 This factor can also be considered 
within the balancing framework alongside an analysis of the artistic merit.  
 
VI Conclusion 
For as long as mankind can remember, individuals have attempted to censor the speech of 
others when this causes offence. The question of offence to religion has resulted in a 
number of UN resolutions condemning defamation of religion. Muslims aggrieved by 
words, actions or other forms of expression that offend the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammed 
or Allah, have strongly encouraged the UN to go one step further and introduce this as an 
offence under international law. However, at the time of writing it seems unlikely this will 
occur. 
 
New Zealand prides itself on being a multicultural country and while offensive expression 
in this country is often self-regulated, FIANZ has noted a rise in Islamophobic comments 
in the past years. This paper concludes that, while this rise is worrying, it does not warrant 
the criminalisation of this type of expression under domestic law in New Zealand as this 
will likely cause further discrimination. In lieu of a criminal sanction, New Zealand could 
consider a balancing exercise within the existing Bill of Rights framework. 
 
  
157  Films, Videos, and Publications Act 1993, s 3(4)(c). 
158  S 3(3)(a).  
159 S 23(3). 
160  Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, above n 153 at [33]. 
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It is suggested this regulatory framework and general approach to the right to freedom of 
expression aims to ensure this right and the right to freedom of religion can co-exist rather 
than being mutually exclusive. Firstly, the general approach would encourage New 
Zealanders to consider other New Zealanders’ fundamental right to freedom of religion 
when exercising their own right to freedom of expression. Secondly, if the person choses 
to continue with offensive expression – a balancing exercise should be undertaken to try to 
establish whether it ought to be safeguarded against censorship through a regulatory 
framework. This exercise should consider the expression’s purpose, any artistic merit and 
the expression medium used. 
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